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Nominal rigidities due to menu costs have become a standard element in closed
economy macroeconomic modeling. The “New Open Economy Macroeconomics”
literature has investigated the implications of nominal rigidities in an open econ-
omy context and found that the currency in which prices are set has signiﬁcant
implications for exchange rate pass-through to import prices, the level of trade
and net capital ﬂows, and optimal monetary and exchange rate policy. While the
literature has exogenously assumed in which currencies goods are priced, in this
paper we solve for the equilibrium optimal pricing strategies of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that
the higher the market share of an exporting country in an industry, and the more
diﬀerentiated its goods, the more likely its exporters will price in the exporter’s
currency. Country size and the cyclicality of real wages play a role as well, but
are empirically less important. We also show that when a set of countries forms
a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade
than the sum of the currencies it replaces.I Introduction
The key assumption in new Keynesian macroeconomics is that prices are infre-
quently adjusted due to small menu costs. At the international level, however,
there is an entirely diﬀerent dimension to this issue. If exporting ﬁrms set prices
in foreign markets, and infrequently adjust them, in what currency should they
set these prices? One reason why this is an important question is revealed in
Figure 1, which shows a clear negative relationship between the fraction of im-
ports invoiced in the importer’s currency and the pass-through of exchange rate
changes to import prices for a set of 7 industrialized countries.1 If ﬁrms set prices
in the importer’s currency, we should expect zero pass-through. If instead prices
are set in the exporter’s currency, we should see full pass-through. Incomplete
pass-through can explain the observed large volatility of real exchange rates and
the signiﬁcant correlation between nominal and real exchange rates. The extent of
pass-through also has profound implications for monetary policy. The recent “new-
open economy macroeconomics” literature, which has adopted the new-Keynesian
assumption of rigid prices in an open economy context, has shown that assump-
tions about invoicing are critical for optimal monetary policy and the choice of
exchange rate system.2
The main objective of this paper is to derive and understand the optimal in-
voicing decisions in the context of “new open economy macroeconomics” models.
While most of the literature has assumed exogenously that ﬁrms set prices either in
their own currency or in that of the importer, ﬁrms are not neutral between these
choices. The optimal invoicing choice of ﬁrms depends on the uncertainty of their
proﬁts under diﬀerent invoicing strategies. We show that the two most important
factors determining the invoicing choice based on the theory are (i) the market
1We take the short-term pass-through coeﬃcients from Jose Campa and Linda Goldberg
(2001, Table 2) and the invoicing data for the year 1995 from Peter Bekx (1998).
2The issue of optimal monetary and exchange rate policy is analyzed in Philippe Bacchetta
and Eric van Wincoop (2000), Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti (2001) and Michael B.
Devereux and Charles Engel (1998). Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998,2000) also show that
the level of trade and net capital ﬂows are aﬀected by the invoicing choice. Engel (2001)
provides a survey of the implications of diﬀerent pricing strategies. For general descriptions
of the new open economy macro literature, see Philip R. Lane (2001), Maurice Obstfeld and
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Figure 1: Pass-through and Invoicing
share of an exporting country in a foreign market, and (ii) the extent to which
products of domestic ﬁrms are substitutes for those of competing foreign ﬁrms.
The higher the exporter’s market share in an industry, and the more diﬀerentiated
the products, the more likely ﬁrms are to price in the exporter’s currency. On the
other hand, international competition will be strong when the market share of the
exporting country is low and its goods are close substitutes with those of foreign
competitors. In that case exporting ﬁrms are more likely to price in the currencies
of their foreign competitors.
There is some evidence indicating that these two factors are indeed empirically
relevant. Koichi Hamada and Akiyoshi Horiuchi (1987), analyzing a 1984 sur-
vey of Japanese ﬁrms, write that “...Japanese ﬁrms report that a principal reason
for foreign-currency-invoiced export contracts is the hard pressure from interna-
tional competition.” More formal evidence comes from the pass-through literature.
Robert Feenstra et. al. (1996) show that for the automobile industry a high mar-
ket share of an exporting country is associated with a relatively high pass-through
2elasticity for that country’s exporters.3 Jiawen Yang (1997) ﬁnds a positive rela-
tionship between US import pass-through elasticities for three and four-digit SIC
industries and diﬀerent proxies of product diﬀerentiation. Sectoral invoicing data
could provide the most convincing evidence, but such data are scarce. Giorgio Ba-
sevi et. al. (1987) and Page (1980) provide some evidence indicating that invoicing
in the exporter’s currency is more common in more diﬀerentiated goods sectors.
For aggregate invoicing data Figure 2 shows a clear positive relationship between
the trade-weighted average market share of an exporting country and the fraction
of its exports invoiced in the exporter’s currency.4 The US and Germany have a
signiﬁcantly higher average market share than the other countries and also have
the largest fractions invoiced in their own currency. Japan has the lowest fraction
of exports invoiced in its own currency. While Japan is the second biggest indus-
trialized country, it has a small market share both because its exports are small
relative to its GDP, and because more than half of its exports to industrialized
countries go to the United States.5
Two recent papers look at the optimal currency denomination of trade in the
context of the “new open economy macroeconomics”.6 In Bacchetta and van Win-
coop (2001), we numerically solve the invoicing decision in a general equilibrium
model. The optimal strategy depends on various preference parameters, but the
intuition is far from clear. Devereux and Engel (2001) derive an analytical solu-
tion to the invoicing choice under a particular parameterization. They show that
countries with lower monetary volatility may prefer to price in their own currency.
3Along similar lines, Richard Feinberg (1986) ﬁnds that import pass-through in Germany is
higher in sectors where the import share is larger.
4Market share is deﬁned as manufacturing exports to a country divided by total manufacturing
sales in that country (gross output plus imports). Since these are aggregate data, the levels are
not very meaningful; our interest is in diﬀerences across countries.
5Japan’s goods are also relatively close substitutes with those of competitors. Peter Hooper
et.al. (1998) ﬁnd that the overall export price elasticity is higher for Japan than for other indus-
trialized countries, suggesting that Japan’s goods are less diﬀerentiated than those of others. We
have also computed for each country’s exports a trade-weighted average elasticity of substitution
for 62 commodity-groups, using estimates of elasticities for each of these groups from David
Hummels (1999). Japan has indeed the highest elasticity.
6There is another literature that examines the choice of currency as a medium of exchange.
See, for example, Helene Rey (2001) for an interesting contribution. In our context, this dimen-
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Figure 2: Invoicing and Market Share
It is very diﬃcult to understand the results from such general equilibrium models
as various mechanisms are at work. The robustness of these results is also diﬃcult
to evaluate.
Our starting point here is that of an older partial equilibrium currency in-
voicing literature, which studies the invoicing decision of a single ﬁrm selling in a
foreign market and setting the price before the exchange rate is known. While this
literature has easily identiﬁable limitations, it provides us with a simple starting
point and allows us to connect the existing theoretical literature on the subject
of currency invoicing with the more modern “new open economy macro” general
equilibrium models. The very simple setup of this older literature already provides
insights on the role of product diﬀerentiation (or demand elasticity).
In order to gain intuition about the optimal invoicing strategies we extend the
simple “old-style” partial equilibrium model in several steps. Each step provides
additional insights that would be hard to understand when taken all at once. We
ﬁrst extend the model by allowing ﬁrms to take the invoicing decisions of other
4ﬁrms into account. This leads to strategic complementarities. Market share of the
exporting country then becomes a critical factor. We consider both a two-country
and multi-country version of the partial equilibrium model. The latter provides
relevant insights about the implications of European Monetary Union. We then
extend the model to a general equilibrium setting, in which the exchange rate is en-
dogenous, by introducing stochastic aggregate demand through monetary shocks.
In order to simplify matters, we ﬁrst keep nominal wages ﬁxed by allowing for
nominal rigidities in the labor market. The results then turn out to be essentially
the same as in the partial equilibrium model. When allowing for nominal wage
ﬂexibility, we ﬁrst consider a constant real wage. In that case country size plays a
role separate from market share. In the last step we allow for real wage volatility.
While country size and real wage volatility can theoretically play a role, we argue
that empirically they are not very relevant. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss an extension
that allows for complete asset markets; the rest of the paper assumes that there is
no trade in assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we discuss a
partial equilibrium model of invoicing, starting with a framework familiar from the
old currency invoicing literature. We then extend the model to allow ﬁrms to pay
attention to the invoicing decisions of competing ﬁrms, ﬁrst in a two-country setup
and then in a multi-country setup. We derive results analytically by focusing on
small levels of risk. Section III builds on the ﬁndings of section II by expanding
the model to a general equilibrium setup. Section IV oﬀers conclusions.
II Invoicing Choice in Partial Equilibrium
In this section we ﬁrst discuss the invoicing decision within a partial equilibrium
model that is commonly adopted in the invoicing literature.7 We then extend this
approach by allowing ﬁrms to take the invoicing choice of other ﬁrms into account,
7The representative papers include Alberto Giovannini (1988), Shabtai Donnenfeld and Itzhak
Zilcha (1991), and Richard Friberg (1998). In addition to the basic decision of pricing in ex-
porter’s or importer’s currency, Friberg (1998) and Martin Johnson and Daniel Pick (1997)
examine the optimality of an international vehicle currency. Johnson and Pick also examine
exporters from two countries competing in a third market and show that multiple equilibria can
occur.
5which leads to strategic complementarities.
II.1 An “old-style” partial equilibrium model
Following the standard approach of the partial equilibrium invoicing literature,
ﬁrms are assumed to face a demand function D(p), where p is the price faced by
the importer, and a cost function C(q) of output.8 Firms set prices before they
know the exchange rate, which is the only source of uncertainty. Each ﬁrm has to
choose whether to set a price pI in the importer’s currency or a price pE in its own
currency (the exporter’s currency). In the former case p = pI, while in the latter











When setting the price in the importer’s currency, there is uncertainty about
the price denominated in the exporter’s currency, SpI, but there is no demand
uncertainty. On the other hand, when setting the price in the exporter’s currency,
there is only uncertainty about demand, and thus cost, as the price in the im-
porter’s currency ﬂuctuates with the exchange rate.9 Firms need to compare the
expected utility of proﬁts under the two price setting options: EU(ΠE)−EU(ΠI).
Ac o m m o nﬁnding in the literature is that the exporter’s (importer’s) currency is
preferred when ΠE is globally convex (concave) with respect to S. This result is
entirely independent of the degree of risk-aversion with respect to proﬁts.
Before we discuss the intuition behind this, it is useful to ﬁrst point out a tech-
nical problem when applying this result to any particular set of cost and demand
functions. Generally the proﬁt function under exporter’s currency pricing has both
concave and convex parts, so that this key result of the literature does not apply.
Moreover, the result also does not apply in extensions discussed below, whereby
8Some papers introduce a distribution sector, so the exporting ﬁrm does not sell directly to
consumers, but sells to an importing ﬁrm. The pricing decision then results from the interactions
between the exporter and the importer. See, for example David P. Baron (1976) or John F.O.
Bilson (1983). In this paper we do not introduce the distribution sector explicitly.
9Thus, in partial equilibrium the currency denomination of trade is similar to ﬁxing the price
or the quantity when demand is uncertain. Therefore, the analysis of Paul D. Klemperer and
Margaret A. Meyer (1986) can be applied in this context.
6proﬁts under importer’s currency pricing are a non-linear function of the exchange
rate. We avoid these problems by focusing on uncertainty near S = S, a deter-
ministic exchange rate. We will therefore focus on “small” levels of risk, where the
variance of S tends to zero. We can then derive all results about optimal invoicing
decisions analytically, even for rather complicated general equilibrium structures.
Numerical simulations show that higher levels of risk generally lead to the same
results as under small amounts of risk.
We evaluate the impact of a small amount of risk on the optimal pricing strategy
by taking the marginal derivative of EU(ΠE)−EU(ΠI) with respect to the variance
σ2 of the nominal exchange rate, evaluated at σ2 =0 .L e tU0 and U00 be the ﬁrst
and second order derivatives of utility with respect to proﬁts and S = E(S). In
the Appendix we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ΠE(S;x) and ΠI(S;x) be two proﬁtf u n c t i o n s ,w h e r ex is a vector
of parameters that depend on σ2. Assume that ∂(ΠE − ΠI)/∂x =0and ΠE = ΠI

















All derivatives are evaluated at S = S and σ2 =0 .
In our example x represents the prices that the ﬁrm sets. The condition in
L e m m a1i si n d e e ds a t i s ﬁed since the envelope theorem tells us that the ﬁrst order
derivative of proﬁts with respect to the price is zero. We therefore do not have to
be concerned about the eﬀect of σ2 on optimal prices. Prices can simply be held
constant at their deterministic levels, where pI = pE/S. This feature, which also
holds for general equilibrium models, simpliﬁes the analysis tremendously.
Under our assumptions, the curvature of proﬁts matters for the optimal pricing
decision, but not the curvature of the utility function. For the proﬁt functions (1)
and (2) the marginal derivative of proﬁts with respect to the exchange rate is
the same, i.e., ∂ΠE/∂S = ∂ΠI/∂S,w h e nﬁrms set prices optimally. Intuitively,
the eﬀect of the exchange rate on both proﬁt functions is the same if prices can
be immediately adjusted to the exchange rate. But since a change in prices has
no ﬁrst order eﬀect on proﬁt s ,ac h a n g ei nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ea ﬀects both proﬁt
7functions identically even for preset prices. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of (3) is then zero, so that the rate of risk aversion does not matter. Since U0 > 0,
the second term on the right hand side implies that for a marginal increase in the
variance of the exchange rate, expected utility is higher under the pricing system
with the largest convexity (second order derivative) of proﬁts.
To gain further intuition, we now consider a speciﬁc set of constant elasticity





where µ is the price elasticity of demand and w t h ew a g er a t e .T h ec o s tf u n c t i o n
is convex for η > 1. It follows directly from the production function q = L(1/η),
where L is labor input and the capital stock is held constant in the short run.
η is therefore the reciprocal of the labor share and will generally be somewhere
between 1 and 2.
Applying Lemma 1 to these speciﬁc cost and demand functions leads to the
following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider a ﬁrm exporting to a foreign market, which faces demand
and cost functions given by (4) and (5). For small levels of risk as deﬁned in
Lemma 1,t h eﬁrm chooses the following pricing strategy:
• If µ(η − 1) < 1,t h eﬁrm prices in the exporter’s currency
• If µ(η − 1) > 1,t h eﬁrm prices in the importer’s currency
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the two proﬁt functions
for marginal deviations of S from S, holding prices constant at the deterministic
level. The derivative of proﬁts with respect to the exchange rate is positive, that
is, a depreciation raises proﬁts. As discussed above, the ﬁrst order derivative is the
same whether the ﬁrm prices in the importer’s or exporter’s currency. When µ(η−
1) < 1(> 1), proﬁts are convex (concave) when the ﬁrm prices in the exporter’s
currency and for S 6= S are always larger (smaller) than when the ﬁrms price in
the importer’s currency.
One can also interpret the results in the context of price and demand uncer-










Figure 3: Proﬁt Functions
the ﬁrst order derivative of proﬁts with respect to the exchange rate is identical
under the two invoicing strategies, the ﬁrst order eﬀect on the variance is the same.
This explains why the rate of risk-aversion does not matter. We therefore only have
to consider the impact on expected proﬁts. Under importer’s currency pricing the
proﬁt function is linear in the exchange rate and expected proﬁts are unaﬀected.
When ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency, two factors aﬀect expected proﬁts.
First, when η > 1 the cost function is convex, implying that a rise in demand
raises costs more than a decline in demand lowers costs. The demand volatility
that arises when ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency therefore lowers expected
proﬁts, making pricing in the importer’s currency more attractive. This eﬀect is
stronger the larger µ, which raises demand volatility. On the other hand, the ex-
pected level of demand rises since demand is a convex function of the exchange
9rate and is proportional to Sµ. T h i sr a i s e se x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts when pricing in the
exporter’s currency. The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates when (η − 1)µ>1.
II.2 Introducing Strategic Complementarities: The Role
of Market Share
We now extend the model to highlight the role of strategic complementarities and
market share when multiple domestic ﬁrms compete in a foreign market. One
can think of the model described so far as that of one ﬁrm exporting to a foreign
market dominated by foreign ﬁrms that set the price in their own currency. Results
change, however, if we allow the exporting country to have a large market share.
In that case an exporting ﬁrm is concerned with the invoicing decisions of other
exporters that it is competing with. For now, we assume that all exporting ﬁrms
are from the same country, leaving the case of multiple exporting countries to the
next subsection.
We consider a particular industry in which N exporting ﬁrms from the Home
country sell in the market of the Foreign country, which has N∗ domestic ﬁrms.
The market share n = N/(N + N∗) of the exporting country becomes a critical
element of the analysis. Assuming CES preferences with elasticity µ>1a m o n g










where pj is the price set by the ﬁrm measured in the importer’s currency. The













d∗ is the real level of Foreign spending on goods in the industry, which is equal
to the nominal level of spending divided by the industry price index. We hold d∗
constant in the partial equilibrium model, but it will be stochastic in the general
equilibrium model discussed in the next section. It is assumed that the total
number of ﬁrms is large enough so that an individual ﬁrm does not aﬀect the
industry price index.
10Af r a c t i o nf of Home country ﬁr m ss e t sap r i c epE in their own (exporter’s)
currency, while a fraction 1−f sets a price pI in the importer’s currency. Foreign
ﬁrms set a price pH∗ in their own currency, so that our focus is on the invoicing de-









1−µ + n(1 − f)(p
I)
1−µ¢1/(1−µ) (8)
The price index depends on the exchange rate to the extent that Home ﬁrms price
in the exporter’s currency, which leads to a price pE/S in the Foreign currency.
One can think of the case typically considered in the literature as one where n
is inﬁnitesimally small, so that the industry price index is simply pH∗,w h i c hi sa
constant.
We consider two types of equilibria, Nash equilibria and coordination equilibria.
Nash equilibria are the outcome of a Nash game, where each ﬁrm makes an optimal
invoicing decision conditional on the invoicing decisions of all other ﬁrms. In
general there will be multiple Nash equilibria. The coordination equilibrium is the
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium for the exporting country’s ﬁrms. Home country
ﬁrms therefore coordinate on the invoicing decision. This does not mean that there
is collusion in price setting, which would violate anti-trust laws in most countries.
Each ﬁrm still independently chooses its optimal price in the chosen currency.
Nash equilibria can be found by applying Lemma 1 for each ﬁrm conditional
on the invoicing strategy chosen by other ﬁrms. The coordination equilibrium can
be found by applying Lemma 1 to the proﬁt functions under the diﬀerent Nash
equilibria to see which one yields the highest expected utility. Applying this to the
demand function (6), we obtain Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Consider ﬁrms exporting to a foreign market, facing cost and de-
mand functions given by (5) and (6). Deﬁne ¯ n =0 .5 − 0.5/µ(η − 1).F o rs m a l l
levels of risk as deﬁned in Lemma 1, ﬁrms choose the following pricing strategies:
• If µ(η − 1) < 1, ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency
• If µ(η − 1) > 1 and n < ¯ n ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency
• If µ(η−1) > 1 and n > ¯ n there are three Nash equilibria: (i) all price in ex-
porter’s currency, (ii) all price in importer’s currency, (iii) a fraction prices
11in the exporter’s currency, while the rest prices in the importer’s currency.
If ﬁrms coordinate they prefer to all price in the exporter’s currency if either
n or the rate of risk-aversion are large enough.
The Proposition implies that market share of the exporting country is crucial
for the pricing decision. If the market share is small, below the cutoﬀ ¯ n,t h e
results are unchanged relative to Proposition 1. In particular, ﬁrms price in the
importer’s currency if demand is suﬃciently price elastic. If the market share
is above the cutoﬀ ¯ n there are multiple equilibria when µ(η − 1) > 1. One of
these equilibria is one in which all ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency. This is
the preferred equilibrium when ﬁrms coordinate on the invoicing strategy if either
they are suﬃciently risk-averse or their market share is suﬃciently large. These
results imply that ﬁrms are more likely to price in the exporter’s currency if their
country’s market share is large.
The Proposition is further illustrated in Figure 4. For each of the three cases
of Proposition 2, it graphs
∂[EU(ΠE)−EU(ΠI)]
∂σ2 as a function of f.W h e nµ(η −1) < 1
the expected utility from proﬁts is highest when pricing in the exporter’s currency,
independently of the pricing strategy chosen by other ﬁrms (line A). When µ(η −
1) > 1 ﬁrms prefer to price in the importer’s currency when all other exporting
ﬁrms do so as well (f =0 ,i nl i n e sBa n dC ) .B u tt h em o r eo t h e rﬁrms price in the
exporter’s currency, the more attractive it becomes for the marginal ﬁrm to do so
as well. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h eu p w a r ds l o p i n gl i n e .
The positive slope represents strategic complementarities. In order to under-
stand it, consider the invoicing choice of a marginal ﬁrm. The relative price of
its goods will be less sensitive to the exchange rate, leading to reduced demand
uncertainty, the more of its competitors choose the same invoicing strategy. If
the marginal ﬁrm prices in the importer’s currency, demand uncertainty will in-
crease when more of its competitors price in the exporter’s currency. Since demand
uncertainty lowers expected proﬁts when the cost function is convex, it becomes
increasingly attractive for a marginal ﬁrm to price in the exporter’s currency when
more of its competitors do the same.
The importance of this strategic complementarity depends on the market share
of the exporting country. When the exporting country has small market share, the
pricing strategy of competing ﬁrms from the exporting country has relatively little
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Figure 4: ProﬁtD i ﬀerences vs the Proportion of Firms Pricing in their Own Cur-
rency
slope is relatively ﬂat. Firms then still prefer to price in the importer’s currency.
But when the market share of the exporting country is large, as illustrated with
line C, ﬁrms prefer to price in the exporter’s currency when all other ﬁrms do
the same. In the extreme case where n = 1, so that the exporting country is
completely dominant, there is no demand uncertainty at all when all ﬁrms price
in the exporter’s currency. In the case of line C, there is also a third equilibrium
in mixed strategies. However, this equilibrium is unstable and we will ignore it.
If n>¯ n and ﬁrms coordinate on the invoicing strategy, they all prefer to price
in the exporter’s currency if n is large enough or if the rate of risk-aversion is high
enough. In order to understand this, we will focus here on the case where n =1a n d
either all ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency or all ﬁrms price in the importer’s
currency. If all ﬁrms price in the same currency, there is no demand uncertainty.
13Relative prices within the industry are constant. There is still price uncertainty
when ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency. This does not aﬀect expected proﬁts,
but raises the variance of proﬁts. If ﬁrms are risk-averse, they then prefer to price
in the exporter’s currency.
The central message that pricing in the exporter’s currency is more likely the
bigger is the market share of the exporting country is the same for both Nash
equilibria and coordination. There is nonetheless an important diﬀerence between
the two. In the Nash equilibria the invoicing choice of a marginal ﬁrm is determined
entirely by the eﬀect of the invoicing strategy on expected proﬁts, while in the
coordination equilibrium the impact on the variance of proﬁts is critical. Risk-
aversion therefore plays a role under coordination, while it does not aﬀect the Nash
equilibria. The diﬀerence is understood by realizing that with coordination it is
no longer the case that ∂ΠE/∂S = ∂ΠI/∂S since we are comparing the invoicing
choice of all exporting ﬁrms simultaneously rather than that of a marginal ﬁrm.
The industry price index as a function of the exchange rate is unaﬀected by the
invoicing strategy of a marginal ﬁrm, but it is aﬀected by the invoicing choice of
all exporters simultaneously under coordination. Under coordination proﬁts are
more sensitive to the exchange rate when ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency.
In terms of Lemma 1, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (3) is no longer equal
to zero.
We have also worked out the model when there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms that
are each large enough to aﬀect the industry price index. The algebra then becomes
considerably more complicated, but the main result of this section, that pricing in
the exporter’s currency is more likely the larger the market share of the exporting
country, remains unaltered.
II.3 Multiple Exporting Countries
So far we have assumed that there is only one exporting country. We now consider
how results are aﬀected when there are multiple countries exporting to a particular
market, while otherwise maintaining the partial equilibrium setup of the previous
subsection.
Assume that there are Z countries that all sell to a particular market. A fraction
ni of ﬁrms selling to this market is from country i. In principle there could be as
14many as Z currencies, although it is possible that some countries use the same
currency. Let x(i) denote the country in whose currency ﬁrms from country i
invoice their sales. They can price in the exporter’s currency, so that x(i)=i,
the importer’s currency, or the currency of any other country. We now look at
the invoicing decision of a marginal ﬁrm from a particular exporting country, say
country 1. In the Appendix we use a straightforward generalization of Lemma 1
to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider a set of ﬁrms selling in a particular market with a frac-
tion ni of ﬁrms from country i (i =1 ,..,Z). Each ﬁrm faces cost and demand
functions given by (5) and (6). Firms from country i price in the currency of
country x(i). Let the exchange rate Sx be the units of country 1’s currency per
unit of country x’s currency. A marginal ﬁrm from country 1 then prefers to








It is still the case than when µ(η − 1) is suﬃciently small, ﬁrms prefer to price
in their own (exporter’s) currency since var(S1) = 0. The larger µ(η−1), the more
ﬁrms care about demand risk, which is minimized by invoicing in the currency that
is most “similar” to the average invoicing currency chosen by competitors.
There can again be multiple Nash equilibria, even more than before due to the
multiple currencies. Rather than consider all Nash equilibria in the general setup
just described, we will illustrate with some simple examples two key results that
are listed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a setup where ﬁrms from multiple countries sell to a
particular foreign market. Each ﬁrm faces cost and demand functions given by (5)
and (6). Then two general results apply:
1. If none of the countries has a large market share, they are more likely than
i nat w o - c o u n t r ys e t u pt oi n v o i c ei nt h e i ro w nc u r r e n c y . E v e nf o rah i g h
demand elasticity µ they may choose to invoice in their own currency.
2. If a set of countries form a monetary union they are more likely to invoice
in their own currency. Imports by the monetary union are also more likely
to be invoiced in the union’s currency.
15We now discuss two simple examples that illustrate Proposition 4. In a two-
country setup at least one country has half of the market share. This no longer
needs to be the case with multiple countries selling in a particular market. Consider
the extreme case where Z is very large and each country has an equal number of
ﬁrms, so that ni =1 /Z. To further simplify matters, assume that all bilateral
exchange rates have the same variance and correlation ρ.10 It is then easily veriﬁed
from Proposition 3 that for ρ < 0.5o rρ > 0.5a n dµ(η − 1) < 1/(2ρ − 1) there is
an equilibrium where all ﬁrms price in their own currency. Unless ρ is close to one,
ﬁrms are happy to price in their own currency even for a high demand elasticity
µ. In the two-country model ﬁrms from a country with a small market share
price only in their own currency when µ(η − 1) < 1. In that case ﬁrms from the
importing country are necessarily dominant if the market share of the exporter is
small. Firms from the exporting country are then inclined to price in the importer’s
currency to reduce demand risk. In the multi-country example considered here,
demand risk will not be reduced by pricing in the importer’s currency if none of
the other ﬁrms do so.
The second part of Proposition 4 is relevant in the context of EMU.11 It suggests
that the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to lead to more invoicing in
euros than in the sum of the currencies it replaced. For illustrative purposes we
will again use a simple example. Assume that there are Z European countries that
export to one non-European country, say Japan. Each European country has an
equal number of ﬁrms, accounting for a total market share of α. The Japanese
ﬁrms have a market share of 1 − α and price in their own currency in their own
market. We will again assume that all bilateral exchange rates have the same
variance and correlation ρ. We restrict ourselves to two possible equilibria: (i) all
European ﬁrms invoice in their own currency, or (ii) all European ﬁrms invoice in
yen. Deﬁne x =1 /µ(η − 1). Assume that µ(η − 1) > 1a n d




10To be more precise, let Sij be the units of country i currency per unit of country j currency.
T h ev a r i a n c eo fSij and the correlation ρ = corr(Sij,S ik) are assumed to be the same for all
i,j,k.
11See, for example, Philipp Hartmann (1998), for a discussion of the currency denomination
of trade in the EMU context.
16Using proposition 3 it can then be shown that before EMU all European ﬁrms
invoice in yen, while after EMU there is a Nash equilibrium where all ﬁrms invoice
in euro. The latter is the preferred Nash equilibrium under coordination.
The lesson to be drawn from this is that if multiple countries adopt the same
currency, the market share that matters is that of the entire currency union, not
that of individual countries. The concept of a “country” only has meaning here to
the extent that currencies diﬀer. EMU creates a big single currency area, with a
larger market share than that of any of the individual countries that make up the
currency union. For trade between EMU and the rest of the world we are therefore
likely to see more invoicing in euros than pre-EMU invoicing in the currencies that
are replaced by the euro. While the example is for European exports, one can
easily develop similar examples for European imports.
There is one caveat though. The increased invoicing in euros may not be
immediate. In the example above, even after EMU there is still a Nash equilibrium
whereby all European ﬁrms invoice in yen. Under coordination this is not the
preferred invoicing choice, but without coordination history is likely to matter.
The model’s implication that history matters may explain for example why in
Figure 2 the UK is a bit of an outlier, invoicing more in pounds than can be
expected based on market share.
III Invoicing Choice in General Equilibrium
When going from a partial to a general equilibrium setup, the exchange rate is
no longer exogenous. The source of uncertainty in the model shifts to a more
fundamental set of factors. In this paper we will only consider shocks to money
supplies, which are equivalent to money demand shocks. Money is introduced
through a cash-in-advance constraint. The per capita money supplies are M and
M∗ in the Home and Foreign country. The endogeneity of the exchange rate only
matters to the extent that other elements of the cost and demand functions are
also aﬀected by the monetary shocks. This is indeed the case as both the aggregate
demand for goods and wages are aﬀected by the monetary shocks. In the partial
equilibrium model these were both held constant. Another change is that we adopt




where uc is the marginal utility of consumption and P is the consumer price index.
The representative agent framework is chosen mainly for convenience and because
it is standard in the new open economy macro general equilibrium literature. It
is not critical to the results reported in this section.12 The only critical changes
relative to partial equilibrium are the endogenous aggregate demand and wages,
both of which are correlated with the exchange rate.
We consider a three-sector model, with two tradables sectors and one non-
tradables sector. The motivation for introducing a non-tradables sector is that the
sensitivity of the overall consumer price index to the exchange rate becomes a rel-
evant factor. This sensitivity can be signiﬁcantly overstated, leading to misleading
results, if we ignore non-tradables. The motivation for introducing more than one
tradables sector is that we would like to explore the role of country size, which
by construction plays no role in a partial equilibrium setup. With one tradables
sector it is impossible to distinguish between country size and market share in the
industry. We therefore introduce two tradables sectors, A and B. In order to make
the distinction between country size and market share as sharp as possible, and
also simplify the math in the process, we assume that the large Home country is
dominant in sector A and the small Foreign country is dominant in sector B. In
that case we have four conﬁgurations of market dominance and country size: (i)
the large country operating in sector A where it is dominant, (ii) the large country
operating in sector B where it is not dominant, (iii) the small country operating
in sector B where it is dominant, and (iv) the small country operating in sector A
where it is not dominant.
Mathematically this is done as follows. Let J be an integer. The number of
ﬁrms in the large country in sectors A and B is NA = J2 and NB =1 ,w h i l et h e
number of ﬁrms in the small country is N∗
A =1a n dN∗
B = J. In both countries the
share of ﬁrms in the non-tradables sector is αN of the total number of ﬁrms. The
total number of ﬁrms is also equal to the total number of consumers, which is N
12For example, if we instead assumed that “capitalists” own the ﬁrms and consume proﬁts
(maximize the expected utility of proﬁts as in the partial equilibrium case), while “workers”
consume labor income, the results reported below remain unaltered.
18for the large country and N∗ for the small country. We then let J →∞ ,s ot h a t
the small country is inﬁnitesimally small relative to the large country, while the
market shares of the large country in sector A and the small country in sector B
are inﬁnitesimally close to 1. From here on we will refer to that simply as market
dominance.
Since the optimal currency pricing strategies depend critically on the proﬁt
functions of exporters, we will now discuss how the general equilibrium setup
changes the demand and cost functions of the Home country. We always refer to
the small Foreign country with a * superscript.
III.1 Demand and Cost
III.1.1 Demand
The elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors is assumed to be one
and is therefore smaller than the elasticity µ>1 of substitution among the goods








where ci is a CES index with elasticity µ among the output of all ﬁrms in sector i.
The consumption share αi of sector i is also equal to the fraction of ﬁrms operating
in sector i. Corresponding to the evidence, the non-tradables consumption share
αN is assumed to be larger than 0.5.13
We will focus on demand by Foreign residents faced by Home exporters. The
cash-in-advance constraint implies that total nominal income of the Foreign coun-
try is equal to the total money supply, which is N∗M∗.14 Letting again the su-
perscripts E and I refer to prices set in respectively the exporter’s and importer’s
13See for example van Wincoop (1999). αN is even bigger if we interpret non-tradables more
broadly than the traditional services sector, including tradables that are purchased exclusively
from domestic producers due to trade costs. The signiﬁcant home bias in tradables has been well
documented.
14This is the case both when the buyer’s currency and when the seller’s currency is used for
payment. The currency in which payment takes place may be the same or diﬀerent from the
currency in which prices are set. In the model these two are entirely separable.














































where ni is the fraction of sector i ﬁrms that are from the Home country and pH∗
i
is the price of domestically sold goods in the Foreign country.
These demand functions and sectoral price indices are the same as in the partial
equilibrium model. The only diﬀerence is that aggregate real sectoral demand,
referred to as d∗ in the partial equilibrium model, is now N∗M∗/P ∗
i and therefore
depends on monetary shocks. The fact that aggregate demand is stochastic is only
relevant for invoicing decisions to the extent that it is correlated with the exchange


























The exchange rate is therefore simply the ratio of the money supplies.
III.1.2 Cost
The functional form of the cost function also remains unchanged when we move
to a general equilibrium setup. To be consistent with the partial equilibrium
model we assume that each ﬁrm sells exclusively either to the Home market or
to the Foreign market. Since the Home market is much larger than the Foreign
market, it is assumed that the capital stock of tradables ﬁrms that sell to the
20Home country is correspondingly larger. To be precise, the production function
for a tradables ﬁrm z in sector i is Li(z)1/ηKi(z)1−1/η,w h e r eLi(z) is labor input
and Ki(z) is the capital stock. The latter is assumed to be 1, N/(N + N∗)a n d
N∗/(N+N∗) respectively for a non-tradables ﬁrm, a tradables ﬁrm that sells to the
Home market and a tradables ﬁrm that sells to the Foreign market. These capital
stocks are proportional to the level of sales in the deterministic equilibrium. The
cost function for all ﬁrms then remains the same as (5) if we scale both cost and
output by the size of the capital stock.
The only change relative to partial equilibrium is that the wage rate is now
generally stochastic. In order to stay as close as possible to the partial equilibrium
model, we will ﬁrst consider a constant nominal wage. A standard approach of
introducing nominal wage rigidities is the one discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996), whereby labor supply is heterogeneous and there are menu costs associated
with changing wages. Total labor input is a CES index of heterogeneous labor
supplies. Labor is monopolistically supplied and each agent sets the wage rate
before uncertainty is resolved. The details do not concern us here and the level at
which wages are preset is irrelevant for the results.
When we allow for a ﬂexible wage rate, it is determined by equilibrium in the
labor market. With a utility function u(c,l) of consumption and leisure, labor













N is the consumer price index.


























The superscript H refers to ﬁrms selling to the domestic market. For the non-
tradables sector there is only domestic demand. The equilibrium wage rate can be
solved by equating aggregate labor supply and demand.
21III.2 Results
III.2.1 Rigid nominal wages
We again derive the analytical results based on small levels of risk. Assuming that
M and M∗ h a v et h es a m ev a r i a n c eσ2, we consider the derivative of E
uc
P (ΠE −ΠI)
with respect to σ2 at σ2 =0 . 15 Using a generalization of Lemma 1, we can derive
the following Proposition when nominal wages are preset.
Proposition 5 Consider the general equilibrium model with rigid nominal wages.
For “small levels of risk”, ﬁrms choose the following pricing strategies:
• If (µ − 1)(η − 1) < 1, ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency
• If (µ−1)(η−1) > 1 and the exporting country has a negligible market share,
ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency
• If (µ − 1)(η − 1) > 1 and the exporting country is dominant in the mar-
ket, there are at least two Nash equilibria: (i) all exporting ﬁrms price in
exporter’s currency, (ii) all price in importer’s currency. If ﬁrms coordinate,
they prefer to price in the exporter’s currency when they are risk-averse.
Proposition 5 is qualitatively identical to Proposition 2 in the partial equilib-
rium model. Market share is still the critical factor in determining the currency
denomination of trade. Country size plays no role. The only diﬀerence is that the
term µ(η − 1) in Proposition 2 is now replaced by (µ − 1)(η − 1). The parameter
region where all ﬁrms invoice in the exporter’s currency has therefore expanded a
bit. This is because the demand risk associated with invoicing in the exporter’s
currency has been reduced. When ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency a depre-
ciation raises demand. But a depreciation tends to be associated with a decline in
the Foreign money supply M∗, which lowers demand. This oﬀsetting eﬀect reduces
demand risk, making pricing in the exporter’s currency more attractive.
15In doing so we hold the correlation between the money supplies constant. One can also hold
the ratio of the variances of M and M∗ constant at a level diﬀerent from one in order to study
the eﬀect of monetary risk on optimal currency invoicing. This is the issue addressed in Devereux
and Engel (2001). In this paper we assume that money supplies have the same variance.
22III.2.2 Rigid real wages
When we allow for ﬂexible wages, results can change signiﬁcantly relative to those
in Proposition 5. The next Proposition considers the case where real wages are





so that ul/uc is a constant.
Proposition 6 Consider the general equilibrium model with a constant real wage
rate. The results of Proposition 5 remain unchanged for the large country. For
the small country the cutoﬀ (µ − 1)(η − 1) > 1 in Proposition 5 is replaced with
(µ−1)(η−1) > 2αN−1 when large country ﬁrms in sector A price in the exporter’s
currency. This makes it more likely that ﬁrms from the small country invoice in
the importer’s currency.
The intuition for Proposition 6 follows naturally by realizing that the only
change relative to Proposition 5 is that the nominal wage is proportional to the
overall consumer price index. For the large country, the consumer price index is
deterministic as the market is dominated by Home ﬁrms that set the price in their
own currency. This is not the case for the small country. When exporting ﬁrms
in the dominant sector of the large country price in the exporter’s currency, the
consumer price index of the small country rises when their currency depreciates;
thus, the nominal wage increases. This increases the expected cost when ﬁrms
invoice in the exporter’s currency, since a depreciation raises both the wage rate
and demand.
Although theoretically country size matters in the model, we do not think
that the channel through which this happens is very important in practice. In
the model it only matters to the extent that exchange rate ﬂuctuations aﬀect the
overall consumer price index and this immediately aﬀects wages. Most studies,
such as Jonathan McCarthy (2000), ﬁnd that in industrialized countries exchange
rate ﬂuctuations have a relatively small eﬀect on the overall consumer price in-
dex. Moreover, only in countries with very high inﬂation rates does unexpected
inﬂation aﬀect wages without much delay. Aggregate invoicing data also suggest
that country size does not play a signiﬁcant role. Figure 5 compares country size
23(log of GDP) to the percent of exports invoiced in the exporter’s currency for the
same seven industrialized countries as in Figures 1 and 2. Invoicing appears to be
less correlated with country size than with market share. In particular, the second
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Figure 5: Invoicing and Size
III.2.3 Stochastic real wages
The next step is to allow for volatility in real wages. Here our main result is in the
form of a warning. Allowing for strongly pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical real wages can
lead to invoicing results that are starkly at odds with the evidence. This can best






24For the large country the real wage rate then becomes proportional to Mγ. γ is
therefore a measure of the degree of pro-cyclicality of real wages. It can be shown
that when the cyclicality parameter γ is larger than µ,a n dη < 2, all ﬁrms in both
sectors in both countries price in the importer’s currency.16 An increase in the
money supply raises the wage rate, but also leads to a depreciation, which increases
demand when ﬁrms invoice in the exporter’s currency. The positive correlation
between wages and demand when ﬁrms invoice in the exporter’s currency increases
expected costs and lowers expected proﬁts.
As has been extensively documented, real wages are neither strongly pro-
cyclical nor strongly anti-cyclical. Allowing for strong cyclicality in real wages
therefore contradicts most evidence. The fact that for strongly cyclical real wages
one can easily get invoicing results that contradict the data should therefore not
be much of a concern. If anything, it tells us that one has to be careful in choosing
parameter values of a new open economy macro model when deriving the optimal
invoicing results. It is easy to choose parameter values that lead to misleading
results. For example, with preferences such as (18), the parameter γ plays a dual
role, determining both the rate of relative risk-aversion and the cyclicality of real
wages.17
III.3 Complete Asset Markets
Throughout the paper we have assumed that no assets are traded internationally.
We now brieﬂy discuss the implications of allowing for complete asset markets,
so that there is full risk-sharing across the two countries. Assuming that nominal
wages are rigid, the only impact of risk-sharing on the proﬁt functions is through
its eﬀect on aggregate demand. Risk-sharing does not qualitatively alter the main
16More generally, the following equilibria apply to ﬁrms from the large country. When (η −
1)(µ−1) < 1−γ all ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency. When (η−1)(µ−1) < γ−1a l lﬁrms
in all countries price in the importer’s currency. When (η − 1)(µ − 1) is larger than both 1 − γ
and γ − 1, all ﬁrms in non-dominant sectors price in the importer’s currency, while ﬁrms in the
dominant sectors price in the exporter’s currency.
17In Devereux and Engel (2001), γ plays the additional role of money demand elasticity. Money
demand is modeled through money in the utility function by augmenting the preferences in (18)
with the log of the real money supply. They additionaly assume η =1 . I nt h a tc a s en e i t h e r
country size, nor market share matter. The level of µ also does not aﬀect the equilibrium invoicing
strategies.
25results of the paper, but it makes invoicing in the importer’s currency more likely.
The Appendix describes the algebraic details. Here we only discuss the intuition.
In our small-large country model, only the small country is able to share risk in
aw a yt h a ta ﬀects its per capita consumption. Although that is a special case, it
can be veriﬁed that the direction in which risk-sharing aﬀe c t st h er e s u l t si st h es a m e
when we allow for two equally sized countries that both beneﬁt from risksharing.
The Nash equilibria for Foreign country ﬁrms remain the same as in Proposition 5.
Since per capita consumption of the Home country remains unchanged, the proﬁt
functions of Foreign country exporters remain unchanged. The proﬁt functions of
Home country exporters change as aggregate demand by Foreign country residents
is no longer proportional to M∗. Aggregate demand in general depends positively
on both M∗ and M as a result of the risk-sharing.
We saw in Proposition 5 that in the case of no risk-sharing, pricing in the
exporter’s currency became somewhat more likely than in the partial equilibrium
model. Demand risk is weakened when ﬁrms price in the exporter’s currency since
the rise in demand as a result of a depreciation tends to be oﬀset by a decline
in aggregate Foreign demand as a result of a drop in M∗. With full risk-sharing,
Foreign demand depends positively on both Home and Foreign money supplies, so
that the oﬀsetting eﬀect is smaller (and could even go the other way). Pricing in
the exporter’s currency therefore becomes less attractive.
IV Conclusions
The recent new open economy macroeconomics literature has shown that the cur-
rency in which prices are set has signiﬁcant implications for trade ﬂows, capital
ﬂows, nominal and real exchange rates, as well as optimal monetary and exchange
rate policies. Since one of the main objectives of the recent literature is to bring
microfoundations to macroeconomic analysis, it is natural to consider the optimal
pricing strategy of ﬁrms within the context of this literature. Our main approach
has been to build intuition by starting from a simpler partial equilibrium frame-
work, which has also allowed us to connect the older partial equilibrium literature
on currency invoicing with the more modern general equilibrium new open econ-
omy macro models.
We ﬁnd that the two main factors determining the invoicing choice are market
26share and diﬀerentiation of goods. The higher the market share of an exporting
country, and the more diﬀerentiated its goods, the more likely its exporters will
price in the exporter’s currency. In the introduction we brieﬂy discussed some ev-
idence consistent with these ﬁndings. There is clearly a need for further empirical
work to conﬁrm that these are critical factors. The model also implies that greater
country size makes invoicing in the exporter’s currency more likely, although we
have argued that the empirical relevance of the mechanism is likely to be lim-
ited. Finally, we found that when drawing conclusions from new open economy
macro models about invoicing one needs to be careful in choosing parameters. In
particular, parameter choices that lead to strongly cyclical real wages can lead to
misleading results.
There are two important directions for future research. First, since the focus
of this paper has been on positive economics (understanding currency invoicing),
we have ignored the normative implications. In previous work (Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2000)) we have addressed the welfare implications of exchange rate
regimes holding ﬁxed the invoicing choice of ﬁrms. It is clear though that the in-
voicing choice will be aﬀected by monetary and exchange rate policies, which needs
to be taken into account. A second direction for research involves the distinction
between trade prices and retail prices. Several authors have emphasized the fact
that exchange rate changes are passed on to a larger extent to import prices than
to consumer prices. In this paper we have made no distinction between the two.
Future research needs to better understand the role of the distribution sector as
an intermediary.
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31Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Take the two proﬁt functions ΠE(S;x)a n dΠI(S;x) considered in the Lemma. We
examine small levels of risk around S = E(S). Since ∂(ΠE − ΠI)/∂x =0w eo n l y
need to consider proﬁts as a function of S, holding x constant at its deterministic
level. It is assumed that ΠE(S)=ΠI(S). Let f(S)=U(ΠE) − U(ΠI). We have































where U00 and U0 are evaluated at S.












Using the equation for fSS(S) and assuming that S is constant gives Lemma 1.
Higher order terms in the Taylor expansion do not matter. In order to see this,
assume that S− ¯ S is equal to σy,w h e r ey has expectation 0, variance 1 and its dis-
tribution does not depend on σ or, even weaker, the derivative of Ey n (n>2) with
respect to σ (evaluated at σ =0 )i sﬁnite. The derivative of E(S− ¯ S)n = σnE(yn)
with respect to σ2 is then zero for n>2w h e ne v a l u a t e da tσ =0 .
Proof of Proposition 1
¿From (1), (2), (4), and (5), the ﬁrm’s proﬁt functions are:
Π
I = S ·
¡
p













First, notice that for σ2 =0a n dE(S)=¯ S =1 ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c es e tb yt h eﬁrm




32Then, Lemma 1 applies since ΠE(1;x)=ΠI(1;x)a n d∂(ΠE − ΠI)/∂x =0 ,w h e r e






1−µ [1 − µ(η − 1)]
w h o s es i g nd e p e n d so nt h es i g no f1− µ(η − 1).
Proof of Proposition 2
With strategic complementarities, we ﬁrst examine the incentives of a marginal
ﬁrm given the behavior of the other ﬁrms. Then we determine the Nash equilibrium
such that the marginal ﬁrm does not deviate. In the coordination case, all ﬁrms
take the same action simultaneously. Without loss of generality we set d∗/(N +
N∗)=1 .U s i n g( 6 ) ,p r o ﬁts of ﬁrm i are:
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where P ∗ is given by (8). First notice that for σ2 =0a n dS = ¯ S =1 ,a l lﬁrms
c h o o s et h es a m ep r i c e :pH = pE = pI ≡ p. This implies that in the deterministic
equilibrium P∗ = p. The optimal price is given by:
(µ − 1)p = ηµw (24)
In computing the derivatives of proﬁts, the main diﬀerence with Proposition 1 is





1 − n + nfS
µ−1 + n(1 − f)
¤ µ
1−µ






[1 − µ(η − 1)(1 − 2fn)]
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of 1 − µ(η − 1)(1 − 2fn). There
can be three types of Nash equilibria:
• f =0a n dEU(ΠE) <E U(ΠI). In this case, all ﬁrms price in the importer’s
currency and the marginal ﬁrm still prefers pricing in the importer’s currency.
33• f =1a n dEU(ΠE) >E U (ΠI). All ﬁrms price in their own currency and
the marginal ﬁrm prefers pricing in its own currency.
• EU(ΠE)=EU(ΠI)a n d0<f<1. This is a mixed equilibrium, where a
proportion f of ﬁrms prices in their own currency and the marginal ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent as to it pricing strategy.
There is an equilibrium where all ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency (f =0 )
when µ(η − 1) > 1. There is an equilibrium where all ﬁrms price in the exporter’s
currency (f = 1) when either n>¯ n or n<¯ n and µ(η−1) < 1. When n>¯ n there
is also a mixed equilibrium with 0 <f<1.
When ﬁrms coordinate, they consider their best pricing strategy given that all
the others do the same. Thus, if they price in their own currency, they assume
f =1a n dt h u s∂P ∗/∂S = −np; when they price in the importers currency, they
assume f =0a n dt h u s∂P∗/∂S =0 .T h i si m p l i e s :
∂[EU(ΠE) − EU(ΠI)]
∂σ2 =0 .5U




For n close to one or n>0a n dU00 suﬃciently large, this expression is positive, so
ﬁrms prefer to price in the exporter’s currency.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume there are Z countries and that the price of all ﬁr m si se q u a lt oo n e .W e
consider the currency pricing decision of a marginal ﬁrm in country 1 exporting to
country 2. Country 1 exporters will compare proﬁts when they price in their own
currency Π1 or in any other currency Πx.L e tSj b et h ee x c h a n g er a t eo fc o u n t r y
j with respect to country 1, i.e., the quantity of country 1 currency per one unit
of country j currency. Following the same argument as before, we can evaluate
proﬁts at the deterministic prices ¯ p = ηµw/(µ − 1). Proﬁts can be written as:
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¯ p/ e P
´−µ
− w(¯ p/e P)
−ηµ










Since proﬁts now depend on multiple exchange rates, we apply a generalization of
Lemma 1 with S replaced by multiple exchange rates. If we are interested in small
amounts of risk, as deﬁned in Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to look at a second order












cov(Sx,S x(i))( 2 5 )









0(µ − 1)¯ pµ(η − 1)ni
By substituting the above expressions into (25) we get:
2E(f)
(µ − 1)U0¯ p
=( µ − ηµ − 1)var(Sx)+2
Z X
i=1
µ(η − 1)nicov(Sx,S x(i))
The ﬁrms chooses to price in the currency x for which this expression is largest,
which is equivalent to choosing the currency x that minimizes the expression (9)
in Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5
In general equilibrium proﬁts also depend on M and M∗ and ﬁrms maximize
EU cΠ/P instead of EU (Π/P). We prove an extension of Lemma 1, where σ2
represents the variance of money supplies and ρ their correlation and where γ is
t h ed e g r e eo fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o n :
Lemma 2 Let ΠE(S,M,M∗;x) and ΠI(S,M,M∗;x) be two proﬁtf u n c t i o n s ,w h e r e
x(σ2) is a vector of parameters that depend on σ2 and S = M/M∗.A s s u m e
that ∂(ΠE − ΠI)/∂x =0 , ΠE(¯ S,M,M∗;x(0)) = ΠI(¯ S,M,M∗;x(0)) ∀M,M∗,a n d
35ΠE(S,M,M;x)=ΠI(S,M,M;x). A bar refers to σ2 =0 .L e t Uc(M/P(S)) be
the marginal utility with γ = −Ucc·c/Uc. Holding E(M)=E(M∗)= ¯ M constant,
for any twice diﬀerentiable utility function U(.) we have
∂E
Uc
P (ΠE − ΠI)






























All derivatives are evaluated at S = S, M = M, M∗ = M,a n dx = x(0).
Proof: Deﬁne f(S,M,M∗)=Uc
P (ΠE − ΠI). Since S = M/M∗ we can write
this as a function of M and M∗. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, we take a
second order Taylor expansion of f and take the expectation. This gives:
∂Ef(S,M,M∗)




[fMM + fM∗M∗ +2 ρfMM∗]
Since ΠE(¯ S,M,M∗,x(0)) = ΠI(¯ S,M,M∗,x(0)) ∀M,M∗, the last term is equal
to zero. We then compute fSS, fSM, fSM∗,a n dfS, regroup terms and use the
deﬁnition of γ to get Lemma 2.¥
Omitting the ﬁrm’s subscript, a Home exporting ﬁrm’s proﬁts in sector j (scaled
















































The vector x in Lemma 2 consists of all prices that enter directly into the proﬁt
functions, or indirectly through the sectoral price indices P∗
j . Since the marginal
derivative of ΠE − ΠI with respect to these prices is 0, we can apply Lemma 2 by




























36The strategy is to apply Lemma 2 in the two industries for ﬁrms in both
countries under various assumptions about what other ﬁrms do. We then look at
the Nash equilibria, where the optimal behavior of a marginal ﬁrm is consistent
with the industry’s behavior. Both the behavior of Home and Foreign ﬁrms matter.
The various cases diﬀer with respect to the sensitivity of the industry price index
P∗







1−µ + nA(1 − fA)p
1−µ¤1/(1−µ)
(27)
For Home country ﬁrms in sector A, nA =1s ot h a tP∗
A = p for fA =0a n d
P∗
A = p/S for fA =1 ,w h e r efA is the proportion of Home country ﬁrms in sector
A pricing in their own currency. Notice that the pricing of Foreign ﬁrms in this
sector is irrelevant in this case. For Home country ﬁrms in sector B, we simply
have P ∗
B = p independently of what other ﬁrms do.
Taking second order derivatives with respect to S and M∗ and applying Lemma





P (ΠE − ΠI)
∂σ2 =( 1 − ρ)
Uc
P
(µ − 1)((1 − (µ − 1)(η − 1)) for P
∗
j = p (28)
∂E Uc
P (ΠE − ΠI)
∂σ2 =( 1 − ρ)
Uc
P






The second condition is always positive. Hence pricing in the ﬁrm’s own currency
is always an equilibrium if the ﬁrm is in a ’dominant’ sector. The other cases
depend on the sign of 1−(µ−1)(η−1). It is then easy to derive the various cases
of Proposition 5. The results for the small Foreign country are identical since the
proﬁt functions are not aﬀected by country size.
When ﬁrms coordinate, a marginal ﬁrm assumes that other ﬁrms do the same.
Thus, when ﬁrms are in a dominant sector, P∗
j = p/S when ﬁrms price in their
own currency and P∗
j = p when ﬁrms price in the importer’s currency. Proﬁts (still















P (ΠE − ΠI)


















37For the small Foreign country the expression is exactly the same, with a star
added to all the variables. When the country is large, or when the country is small
and the large country prices in the importer’s currency, the derivative of the price
index with respect to the exchange rate is zero. (30) is then positive and ﬁrms
prefer to price in the exporter’s currency. When the country is small and the large
country prices in its own currency, ∂P ∗/∂S∗ =¯ p(1 − αN), where S∗ =1 /S.T h e
Foreign country version of (30) then remains positive under our assumption that
αN > 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 6
The only diﬀerence relative to Proposition 5 is that now the nominal wage rate is
proportional to the consumer price index rather than being a constant. For the
large Home country the consumer price index is a constant, so nothing changes
relative to Proposition 5. We therefore focus on the small country. When fA =0 ,s o
that the dominant sector of the Home country prices in the importer’s currency, the
price index of the Foreign country is constant as well, so again the results remain
the same as in Proposition 5. We therefore only have to consider the invoicing
choice in the Foreign country conditional on fA =1 .L e tw∗ = P∗$,w h e r e$ is
the constant real wage rate. Evaluated at deterministic prices, P∗ =¯ p(S∗)1−αN,
where S∗ =1 /S. The proﬁtd i ﬀerential of Foreign exporters in sector j,s c a l e db y























PA =¯ p,w h i l ePB =¯ p if f∗
B =0a n dPB =¯ p/S∗ if f∗
B =1 . U s i n gL e m m a2 ,
after some algebra we get the following expression for ∂E
Uc∗
P ∗ (ΠE∗ − ΠI∗)/∂σ2:
(1 − ρ)
Uc∗
P ∗ (µ − 1)(2αN − 1 − (η − 1)(µ − 1))if Pj = p (31)
(1 − ρ)
Uc∗
P ∗ (µ − 1)(2αN − 1+( η − 1)(µ − 1)) if Pj =
p
S∗ (32)
Since αN > 0,5, it is always an equilibrium for Foreign ﬁrms in the dominant
sector B to price in the exporter’s currency. The other cases depend on the sign
of 2αN − 1 − (η − 1)(µ − 1 ) .I ti si m m e d i a t e l yc l e a rt h a tt h eo u t c o m ei st h es a m e
as that in Proposition 5, with the cutoﬀ changing from (η − 1)(µ − 1) > 1t o
(η − 1)(µ − 1) > 2αN − 1.
38When ﬁrms in the dominant sector B of the Foreign country coordinate, PB =
¯ p/S∗ when they price in their own currency, while PB =¯ p when they price in the
importer’s currency. The proﬁtd i ﬀerential is then
Π
E∗ − Π







Applying Lemma 2, we get
∂E
Uc∗






P∗ γ(2αN − 1)
This expression is always positive since we assumed that αN > 0.5, implying that
Foreign country ﬁrms in sector B prefer to price in the exporter’s currency.
Deriving the equilibrium exchange rate
We give a sketch of the proof that S = M/M∗.W eu s et h em o m e ym a r k e te q u i -
librium condition (14), with the following demand equations. For non-tradables
DH






































After substituting the demand equations into the money market equilibrium con-
dition (14), we (i) collect terms proportional to M and terms proportional to M∗,
(ii) substitute the Home country equivalent of (13) for P
1−µ
A , and (iii) divide by



























































39We then let J →∞ ,u s i n gNA = J2, NB =1 ,N =( J2 +1 ) /(1 − αN), N∗
A =1 ,
N∗




A/S)1−µ +( 1− fA)(pI
A)1−µ.I tt h e nf o l l o w st h a tf o rJ →∞ ,
S = M/M∗.
Complete Asset Markets
With complete markets, Home and Foreign country residents make state contingent
transfers. Let θ be the per capita transfer paid by Foreign residents in foreign
currency. Foreign nominal per capita income is then M∗ − θ,w h i l ef o rH o m ei ti s
M +θSN∗/N.S i n c eN∗/N → 0, Home income and consumption are not aﬀected
by the transfer, i.e., c = M/p. Moreover, it is easily checked that we still have
S = M/M∗.
We consider the case of rigid nominal wages and a separable utility function
(18), so that Uc = c−γ. With perfect risk sharing, the ratio of marginal utilities is
equal to the real exchange rate, i.e., Uc/U∗
c = P/SP∗.T os a v es p a c e ,w ep r e s e n tt h e
case where γ →∞(the more general case is easily derived and gives qualitatively
similar results). Full risk-sharing then implices c = c∗,s ot h a tc∗ = M/p.

























When fA =0 ,P∗c∗ = pM/p = M.M o r e o v e r ,P ∗










In this case, using Lemma 2 we ﬁnd that
∂E
Uc
P (ΠE − ΠI)
∂σ2 =( 1− ρ)
Uc
P
(µ − 1)((1 − (µ +1 ) ( η − 1))
Compared to (28), this is more likely to be negative, so that the equilibrium with
fA = 0 (importer’s currency) is more likely to hold.
When fA =1 ,P ∗ = p(1/S)1−αN so that P ∗c∗ = MαN(M∗)1−αN.M o r e o v e r ,
P∗
A = p/S and P ∗


















P (ΠE − ΠI)
∂σ2 =( 1− ρ)
Uc
P
(µ − 1)((1 + (µ − 1 − 2αN)(η − 1))
Compared to (29) this expression is more likely to be negative, so that pricing in
the exporter’s currency is less likely to be an equilibrium. Finally, it can be easily
c h e c k e dt h a tas i m i l a rr e s u l th o l d sf o rs e c t o rB .
41